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Critical Analysis of the Master Plan for Higher Education in California
Abstract
The Master Plan for Higher Education in California is often touted as the pinnacle of success in terms of
its contributions to establishing open-access, (nearly) tuition-free higher education for all Californians
who wish to pursue it. This perception, though, may be skewed, as it does not take into account the
historical context of the Plan, nor its potential flaws and shortcomings. This article provides an analysis
and critique of the Master Plan, applying historical and theoretical lenses to frame a more complete
picture of the Plan both at its 1960 inception and today. Viability of the Plan in the early 21st Century is
also explored, and strategies for mitigating some of its shortcomings are identified.
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Oxendine: Analysis of the Master Plan

The Master Plan for Higher Education
in California is often touted as the State’s
penultimate commitment to higher
education for all who would seek it
(Douglass, 2010), a shining example of
higher education’s intended democratizing
role and function and to the State of
California’s commitment to ensuring
upward mobility of its citizens through
open access, tuition-free, higher
education. Unfortunately, though, this
understanding is limited in that it appears
to see the Master Plan only through what
some might deem the rose-colored glasses
of idealism, of what it once was, rather
than what it has become. To fully
understand the Master Plan, we must
critique and analyze it, not from the
standpoint of the romanticized version of
the plan we so often like to invoke in
support of higher education in California,
but through the critical lenses of history
and context, of institutional posturing and
self-preservation, and recent neoliberalist
policies. It is only by more fully
understanding the Master Plan both
within its 1960 context and the shifting
political climate of the last forty years that
we can begin to unravel what, if any of it,
is viable in the 21st century, or if it even is
worth saving.
History and Context
Like many other U.S. states following
World War II, California was bracing itself
for a sharp rise in the number of students
enrolling in its institutions of higher
education. In the decades that preceded,
California saw massive expansions in
institutions of higher education at all
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levels, with legislators pursuing new
campuses in their districts with little
regard for overall state needs (Callan,
2009; Douglass, 2000; 2010). However,
by the late 1950s, the State’s wartime
surplus had been all but depleted, and
California was facing its largest budget
deficit since the Great Depression
(Douglass, 2010). With returning
veterans’ use of their GI Bills and the
coming-of-age of Baby Boomers on the
horizon, both legislative officials and
higher education administrators saw a
need to proactively plan and prepare for
the expansion of higher education in the
State (Callan, 2009; Douglass, 2000; 2010;
Geiser & Atkinson, 2010).
Coinciding with this push to
thoughtfully prepare for the future was
the desire of the State’s regional colleges
(now the California State University
system), led primarily by Malcolm Love,
then-president of San Diego State College,
to expand the purview of the state
colleges by: 1) removing them from the
oversight of the State Board of Education
and creating a separate
governing/oversight board, similar to the
University of California’s Board of
Regents; 2) expanding the degree
programs of the state colleges to include
engineering and the doctorate in
education; and 3) ensuring state funding
to support research at the state colleges
(Douglass, 2000). Rather than fight headon the state college presidents as his
predecessor Robert Gordon Sproul may
have, newly-appointed University of
California (UC) president, Clark Kerr,
began to strategize ways to “move the
public segments—the university, state
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colleges, and junior colleges—toward a
negotiated settlement and to create ‘an
orderly plan’ for higher education in
California” (Douglass, 2000, p. 255), one
that would ensure the UC’s top-tier
institution status within the state’s higher
education system.
Fearing that the legislature would
approve new state colleges without
sufficiently assessing the State’s higher
education needs and driven to protect the
UC’s political position and its share of
state resources, Kerr proposed a study in
1959 that would bring leaders of the
already existent tripartite system together
to construct a compromised, negotiated
plan to collectively move the state’s higher
education system forward in an organized,
cost-effective manner. Kerr’s hope was
that this would be enough to stave off
legislative intrusion and interference into
the inner workings of higher education
and settle some of the turf wars—in
particular, the state colleges’
encroachment on the mission of the
UC—arising in the tripartite system
(Douglass, 2000; Geiser & Atkinson,
2010). Alternatively, and to the disdain of
State Board of Education members like
Raymond Daba, Kerr explored the idea of
the UC’s absorption of the state colleges
should negotiations fail or the legislature
not support such a study (Douglass,
2000). He also enlisted the help of
Assemblywoman, Dorothy Donahoe (D),
by presenting her with “a draft of a
resolution he hoped she might carry in the
legislature…[one that would ask] the
regents and the State Board of Education
to provide a plan” (Douglass, 2000, p.
259-260) for higher education and place a
two-year moratorium on all higher
education legislation (Callan, 2009).
Donahoe, a former high school
administrator and opponent of the
unchecked growth of the state colleges,
agreed and presented Assembly
Concurrent Resolution 88 (ACR 88) to
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the legislature. Its passage ensured the
State Board of Education’s acquiescence
to the study and quelled Kerr’s fears that
the study may go incomplete, leaving the
ultimate fate of the UC’s status in the
hands of the legislature (Callan, 2009;
Douglass, 2000). By July of 1959, Kerr
and State Superintendent of Education,
Roy Simpson, had assembled a team of
nine, led by Arthur Coons, president of
Occidental College, for the Master Plan
Survey Team (Douglass, 2000).
As noted by higher education historian
John Aubrey Douglass (2010), “perhaps
the most profound impact of the 1960
Master Plan is not what it changed, but
what it prevented” (p. 6). The “California
Idea”, as proposed by Douglass—open
access, high quality, affordable higher
education for all high school graduates—
had long been established in California by
the Progressives of the early 1900s
(though it is often erroneously attributed
as a new goal or ideal set forth by the
Master Plan), and the 1920s and 1930s
saw a rapid-response expansion of higher
education, especially within the
community and state colleges (Douglass,
2000; 2010). Thus, though the state’s
foreseen need to grow in terms of its
higher education system(s), as well as its
longstanding progressive-era belief that
higher education was an inalienable right
of its citizens, may have informed or
aligned with some aspects of the Master
Plan, they certainly were not new ideals
created by it. Rather, the Master Plan
appears more likely born of the UC’s
drive to protect its position at the top,
ensure elite students’ access to the UC,
and safeguard its hold on state resources
and is significant more “for what it
preserved than for what it invented”
(Douglass, 2010, p. 2).
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The Plan: Its Principal Points and
Early Merits
After many months of laborious and
sometimes hostile negotiations between
representatives of the UC, state colleges,
and community colleges, the California
Master Plan for Higher Education was
submitted to the legislature for review in
February of 1960. Kerr and
Superintendent Simpson jointly urged
legislators to view the sixty-some
recommendations as a package deal, one
whose success was reliant upon all points
being acted on together as a whole, rather
than as individual stand-alone pieces
(Douglass, 2000). At the time of its
acceptance, the Master Plan solidified the
state’s existing tripartite system and
affirmed the notion of California’s
commitment to universal access to higher
education (Callan, 2009; Douglass, 2000;
2010; Geiser & Atkinson, 2010). Under it,
clear missions and admissions eligibility
pools for the three segments of California
higher education were outlined; a
governing body similar to the UC Board
of Regents, the Board of Trustees, was
established to oversee the state colleges;
and an advisory body, the Coordinating
Council for Higher Education, was
created to review and coordinate the
budgets, degree programs, and expansion
of institutions of higher education in
California. In addition, the Master Plan
reaffirmed California’s progressive-era
commitment to make higher education
affordable and available to all, not only
recommending an expansion of the state’s
existing scholarship program, but also
calling for the creation of a new program
to provide subsistence grants to
scholarship awardees (California
Department of Education, 1960). In
short, it appeared as though the framers
of the Master Plan succeeded in the
creation of a plan that not only benefited
the tripartite system both collectively and
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as separate entities, but also provided
guidance to the legislature in terms of
planned expansion and ensured citizens of
California would continue to enjoy open
access, tuition-free higher education.
Though well-received by Governor Pat
Brown and some lawmakers, the Master
Plan was met with some legislative
concerns—namely, the creation of an
autonomous Board of Trustees for the
state college system and the amendment
of the state constitution to include the
Master Plan—and legislative in-fighting
surrounding how much—or how little—
of the plan should be acted upon. When
all was said and done, Kerr’s and
Simpson’s urging to take the plan as a
whole went unheeded and only pieces of
the plan were codified. Key legislation
surrounding the Master Plan included a
constitutional amendment creating the
Board of Trustees for the California State
Colleges (now California State University,
or CSU) and a statute, the Donahoe
Higher Education Act of 1960, which
created the Coordinating Council of
Higher Education, removed the state
colleges from the oversight of the State
Board of Education, and outlined the
differentiated missions of the tripartite
system institutions. Interestingly, the
recommendations of the Master Plan
often touted as its greatest social
success—open access to (nearly) tuitionfree higher education for all
Californians—were not included and have
never been sanctioned by law, nor have
the admissions eligibility requirements for
the UC or the CSU (Douglass, 2000,
2010).
Even though the package-deal plan
was dismantled in terms of statutes, its
principles led to many deemed successes
in the 1960s and 1970s. With clearly
defined missions and roles in the tripartite
system, higher education as a whole was
able to grow and expand expeditiously in
California. Mission creep, or the
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expansion of established institutions’
missions to include areas of higher
education or degree programs (for
example, the baccalaureate at the
community college, the doctorate at state
universities) not originally included in
their mission (Longanecker, 2008;
Morphew, 2002), was kept at bay. Clearly
defined roles were also established for the
legislature, and lawmakers took to funding
enrollment, while keeping the costs of
such a large system relatively low for
taxpayers, rather than attempting to
micromanage the state colleges, especially,
or self-servingly seeking to establish
colleges or universities in their districts
(Douglass, 2000; 2010). In short, thanks
to the Master Plan and the statutes that
stemmed from it, everyone had a job to
do and was clear not only on what their
job was, but also on what it was not. This
division of roles and responsibilities
allowed California’s system of higher
education to grow in the initial decades
that followed with few substantial growing
pains, all the while keeping access to highquality higher education open and at a low
cost to both students and taxpayers.
Challenges to Viability
The Master Plan is not without its
criticisms, though. When viewed through
the lens of neoliberalism—a shift in
government priorities from ameliorating
inequality, poverty, and social injustice to
promoting competition and economic
growth (Rhoads, Wagoner, & Ryan,
2009)—the Master Plan, at least in today’s
context, seems to be less about ensuring a
well-functioning tripartite system to
support the universal access of
California’s citizens to higher education
and more about perpetuating social
stratification. Even with its flaws, the
Master Plan proved a success in terms of
facilitating the rapid, efficient, planned
growth and expansion of higher education
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in California. The question remains,
though, as to whether or not the plan is
viable in the California of today.
Decreased state funding, increased tuition
and fees, eligibility requirements and
enrollment caps, and low transfer rates
from the community colleges have
contributed to limiting access to four-year
higher education in California at a time
when more students than ever are
academically prepared and qualified for
admittance to the UC and CSU (Public
Policy Institute of California, 2016).
Perhaps, though, we should take a step
back and ask first if the plan should be
viable. If we circle back to where this
paper began—with the ideological
placement of the Master Plan as an
advocate for universal open access to
tuition-free (or nearly tuition-free, or at
least affordable) higher education—few
would argue that the Master Plan, at least
in part, should not be held at minimum as
an aspiration for which we should strive.
Whether functionalist advocates,
instrumentalist Marxist critics, or
institutionalist critics (Dougherty, 2001),
most would agree that a well-educated
society is beneficial to all and necessary as
we move towards more advanced and
globalized markets and industries.
However, if the Master Plan is to remain
even partially feasible or sustainable, those
areas or issues that have been identified as
contributing to its demise or nonfunctionality, namely the lack of state
fiscal support and the change in the
demographics of California and the needs
of its citizens (Callan, 2009; Douglass,
2000; 2010; Geiser & Atkinson, 2010;
Rhoads et al., 2009), must be addressed.
Decreased State Funding
Through the 1960s and 1970s,
California’s fiscal commitment to higher
education held strong, with all three levels
of the tripartite system receiving
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substantial support to keep tuition for
students low or at least modest (Douglass,
2000, 2010). Since then, there has been a
general “disinvestment by state and local
government in higher education”
(Douglass, 2010, p. 13), a phenomena
Rhoads et al. (2009) would deem evidence
of neoliberalism at work. The passing of
Proposition 13 in 1978, which reduced
property taxes by more than half and
severely limited future tax increases, has
had substantial negative consequences on
higher education in California, and the
State has been forced to become more
reliant on those taxes most susceptible to
economic downturns—sales and income
(Callan, 2009). In the 1970s—when
neoliberal governments and policies first
began emerging (Davies & Bansel,
2007)—California’s investment in higher
education accounted for about 25% of the
state budget; today—some 40 years into
neoliberal policy-making—that amount
has fallen to roughly 10% (Public Policy
Institute of California, 2016).
Increased Tuition and Fees
The answer to the State’s
disinvestment cannot be to simply raise
tuition rates, though. Over the last twenty
years, tuition rates at the UC and CSU
have more than tripled, and community
college tuition rates have increased by
almost 40% since 2005 (Public Policy
Institute of California, 2016). Although
financial assistance is available, tuition
increases make higher education
unattainable, or perceived as unattainable,
for low-income Californians. According
to a 2014 study, roughly “86% of
Californians see college affordability as a
problem” (Public Policy Institute of
California, 2016, p. 18). Additionally,
rather than allocating funds to those
institutions that enroll and serve the
majority of California’s college-going
citizens, the community colleges and
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CSUs, funds are directed towards the
“continued and costly expansion of the
University of California” (Callan, 2009, p.
21), an indication of the state’s lack of
commitment to the higher education for
all and ultimately of the success of
protecting the UCs fiscal resources
through the Master Plan.
Demographic Changes
Compounding the problem of the
disinvestment in higher education is the
exponential population growth and shift
in demographics in California. At the
time of the Master Plan’s inception,
California’s population was predominantly
White (92%); by 2015, the state’s
population was much more diverse, with
Latinos accounting for 38.8% of the
State’s population; Whites, 38%;
Asian/Pacific Islanders, 15.2%; and
Blacks, 6.5% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016).
With an increase in underrepresented
population, the “higher education
pipeline” (Callan, 2009, p. 17) established
by the Master Plan does little to serve
many of California’s citizens. Nearly a
decade ago, close to 23% of the State’s
college-age underrepresented population
was enrolled at some level of higher
education; however, only 5% were
enrolled at four-year institutions (Geiser &
Atkinson, 2010). Additionally, nearly half
of those students enrolled at a community
college are from low-income families,
compared to about 25% at the CSU or
UC (Public Policy Institute of California,
2016). Given the barriers of poverty and
the cumulative inequalities—tracking into
vocational or general education, access to
information and college advising.of the K12 system they disproportionately
shoulder, it is little wonder underrepresented students are faced with
attending community college or nothing at
all (Callan, 2009; McDonough & Fann,
2007).
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Eligibility Requirements and Enrollment Caps
Though the eligibility requirements set
forth by the Master Plan are not
sanctioned by law, they are certainly
enforced in practice, with the UC
accepting only those from the top 12.5%
of students and the CSU, from the top
33% (California Department of
Education, 1960). Such eligibility
requirements automatically limit access
and preclude some students, many of
those who are underrepresented and/or
from disadvantaged schools and districts,
from admittance to the UC and possibly
to the CSU. Though the CSU comprises
the largest state university in the nation,
California ranks 47th in the percentage of
students who enroll in four-year
institutions (Public Policy Institute of
California, 2016). Additionally, the State’s
diverse student population is not evenly
represented across the tripartite system;
though student populations at the
community colleges and CSUs more or
less reflect the demographics of the
communities they serve, those at the UC
do not, with Latino and African American
students in particular being underrepresented (Policy Institute of California,
2016).
During lean fiscal times such as
recessions, as noted by Callan (2009), it is
the broad-access institutions of the CSU
and community college system that have
suffered enrollment reductions, effectually
limiting access to hundreds of thousands
of students who are eligible to be
admitted. This is particularly troubling as,
noted above, it is the CSUs and
community colleges that enroll the
greatest percentages of California’s
underrepresented students. According to
the Public Policy Institute of California
(2016), some 14,000 qualified freshmen
applicants were turned away from CSUs
in 2013-2014 alone; with enrollment caps
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remaining and increasing numbers of
students who are eligible for admission,
that number will likely continue to rise.
Because they do not meet the eligibility
requirements of the UC and are turned
away by the CSU and community college
systems due to enrollment caps, many of
California’s high school graduates are
denied the open access to higher
education guaranteed them by the Master
Plan.
Low Transfer Rates from Community Colleges to
Four-Year Institutions
Part of what the Master Plan aimed to
do, and in fact outlined, was establish
clear and easy transfer from the State’s
community colleges to the UCs and CSUs
(California Department of Education,
1960; Callan, 2009; Douglass, 2000; 2010;
Geiser & Atkinson, 2010). Though the
UCs and CSUs held more stringent
eligibility requirements under the Master
Plan, which are problematic in and of
themselves, students who did not meet
these requirements and began at
community colleges would be able to
transfer to one of these institutions upon
completing their general education
requirements at the community college.
This has yet to be fully realized due to the
abysmal transfer rates from the
community colleges to the four-year
institutions (Brint & Karabel, 1989;
Callan, 2009; Dougherty, 2001; Douglass,
2000; 2010; Geiser & Atkinson, 2010;
Public Policy Institute of California,
2016). Though it is estimated nearly half
of all who enroll in the community college
system are transfer-directed or intend to
transfer, only 4% do so within two years
and 13% within three (Public Policy
Institute of California, 2016).
Additionally, there is evidence to suggest
that enrollment in a community college
actually reduces students’ likelihood of
attaining a baccalaureate degree (Geiser &
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Atkinson, 2010; Public Policy Institute of
California, 2016). Only a fifth of those
who begin in the community college and
transfer to a four-year institution succeed
in earning their B.A. (Doughtery, 2001).
The community colleges of California,
proposed under the Master Plan to be the
universal point of entry for those students
who do not meet admissions eligibility for
the four-year institutions, appear to have
become in actuality sieves at best or
complete roadblocks at worst. As
asserted by Burton Clark (1960), “the
conflict between open-door admission
and performance of high quality often
means a wide discrepancy of entering
students and the means of their
realization” (p. 571). Thus, rather than
acting as the stepping stone they are
purported to be under the Master Plan,
community colleges serve the purpose of
protecting the prestige of the four-year
universities, “cooling-out” those students
who are less apt to be successful at the
UCs or CSUs, thereby limiting social
mobility and perpetuating social
stratification and hegemony (Brint &
Karabel, 1989; Clark, 1960; Callan, 2009;
Dougherty, 2001; Douglass, 2000; 2010;
Geiser & Atkinson, 2010). This is
especially troubling given the California
Community Colleges enroll the bulk of
California’s high school graduates, in
general, and underrepresented students, in
particular, who seek higher education
(Public Policy Institute of California,
2016).
Conclusion
The Master Plan for Higher Education
in California is held nationally and
internationally as one of the most
successful models for higher education.
Promising low or no tuition and universal
access to higher education for all high
school graduates, it embodies the
egalitarian ideals of the Progressive Era,
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and its differentiation of mission and clear
roles and responsibilities in the absence of
a statewide higher education coordinating
body undoubtedly helped propel
California forward in terms of expansive,
high-quality higher education. In more
recent decades, though, the presumed
ideal of the Master Plan has not only
faltered but perhaps failed entirely. With
decreased state funding, increased tuition
and fees, stratified admission eligibility
requirements, caps on enrollment, and
low transfer rates from the community
colleges to four-year institutions,
California has fallen from being at the top
of the nation’s degree-awarding states to
ranking near the bottom (Douglass, 2000;
Callan, 2009; Geiser & Atkinson, 2010;
Public Policy Institute of California,
2016). Rather than being used to promote
access and opportunity, it seems as
though the tenets of the Master Plan are
now being used to limit and avert access
via eligibility requirements coupled with
enrollment caps.
Through this, the UC has escaped
relatively unscathed, enjoying
comparatively stable funding, few caps on
enrollment, and continued access to only
the highest-performing, most elite high
school graduates. Given this, it appears as
though Clark Kerr’s push to solidify the
UC’s position at the top of the tripartite
system succeeded. Unfortunately, it has
arguably been at the expense of
Californians, especially under-represented
Californians, who wish to pursue
postsecondary degrees. This effect may
be mitigated if: 1) eligibility policies were
relaxed or expanded; 2) enrollments at
broad-access institutions were not
sacrificed by the legislature during times
of economic downturn; and/or 3) a more
efficient and effective pathway for transfer
from the community college to a four-year
institution were instated; in doing so,
students, especially under-represented
students, might actually begin to equitably

7

Wisdom in Education, Vol. 7 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 2

access—fully access—the egalitarian
and democratizing higher education utopia
supposedly created by the Master Plan.
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